Evo i teksta optuznice
danas sam nasao na netu
ATTACHMENT ATHE INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL TRIBUNAL FOR THE FORMER YUGOSLAVIA
THE PROSECUTOR OF THE TRIBUNAL
AGAINST
RADOVAN KARADZIC
AMENDED INDICTMENT
The Prosecutor of the International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia,
pursuant to her authority under Article 18 of the Statute of the International
Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia ("the Statute of the Tribunal"),
charges:
Radovan KARADZIC,
with GENOCIDE; CRIMES AGAINST HUMANITY; VIOLATIONS OF THE LAWS OR CUSTOMS OF WAR
and GRAVE BREACHES OF THE GENEVA CONVENTIONS OF 1949, as set forth below
THE ACCUSED
Radovan KARADZIC was born on 19 June 1945 in the municipality of Savnik,
presently Republic of Montenegro, Federal Republic of Yugoslavia.
Radovan KARADZIC was a founding member of the Serbian Democratic Party
(hereafter SDS) which was established within the Socialist Republic of Bosnia
and Herzegovina (hereafter Bosnia and Herzegovina) on 12 July 1990. From 12
July 1990 until his resignation on 19 July 1996, Radovan KARADZIC was
President of the SDS. In that capacity he also, inter alia, presided over
meetings of the SDS Main Board.
Radovan KARADZIC is a long-standing associate of Momcilo KRAJISNIK, former
President of the Assembly of Serbian People in Bosnia and Herzegovina
(hereafter Bosnian Serb Assembly) and member of the National Security Council
and expanded Presidency of the so-called Serbian Republic of Bosnia and
Herzegovina (hereafter Serbian republic) and Biljana PLAVSIC, former member of
the collective Presidency of Bosnia and Herzegovina, acting President of the
Serbian republic, member of the Presidency of the Serbian republic and Vice-
President of Republika Srpska.
Radovan KARADZIC became President of the National Security Council of the
Serbian republic on 27 March 1992.
Radovan KARADZIC, became a member of the three-member Presidency of the
Serbian republic on 12 May 1992. On the same day Radovan KARADZIC was elected
President of the Presidency.
Radovan KARADZIC, together with Momcilo KRAJISNIK, Biljana PLAVSIC and other
members of the SDS; served on the expanded Presidency of the Serbian republic
from the beginning of June 1992 until 17 December 1992.
Radovan KARADZIC, along with Momcilo KRAJISNIK, Biljana PLAVSIC and others,
was a member of the Supreme Command of the armed forces of the Serbian
republic from on or about the 30 November 1992.
Radovan KARADZIC was sole President of Republika Srpska from 17 December 1992
until his resignation on 19 July 1996. From 20 December 1992, Radovan KARADZIC
in his capacity as Supreme Commander of the armed forces presided over
sessions of the Supreme Command.
COUNTS
Between 1 July 1991 and 30 November 1995, Radovan KARADZIC, acting
individually or in concert with others, including acting in concert with
Momcilo KRAJISNIK and Biljana PLAVSIC between 1 July 1991 and 31 December
1992; participated in the below-charged crimes in order to secure control of
those areas of Bosnia and Herzegovina which had been proclaimed part of the
Serbian republic. Those areas include but are not limited to the
municipalities of: Banja Luka; Bijeljina; Bileca; Bosanska Krupa; Bosanski
Novi; Bosanski Petrovac; Bosanski Samac; Bratunac; Brcko; Cajnice; Celinac;
Doboj; Donji Vakuf; Foca; Gacko; Hadzici; Ilidza; Ilijas; Jajce; Kljuc;
Kalinovik; Kotor Varos; Nevesinje; Novi Grad; Novo Sarajevo; Pale; Prijedor;
Prnjavor; Rogatica; Rudo; Sanski Most; Sekovici; Sipovo; Sokolac; Teslic;
Trnovo; Visegrad; Vlasenica; Vogosca; Zavidovici; and Zvornik.
In order to achieve this objective, the Bosnian Serb leadership, including
Radovan KARADZIC, and at relevant times Momcilo KRAJISNIK, Biljana PLAVSIC and
others, initiated and implemented a course of conduct which included the
creation of impossible conditions of life, involving persecution and terror
tactics, that would have the effect of encouraging non-Serbs to leave those
areas; the deportation of those who were reluctant to leave; and the
liquidation of others.
Bosnian Serb forces including military, paramilitary, territorial defence and
police units (hereafter Bosnian Serb forces), SDS and government authorities
acting under the direction and control of Radovan KARADZIC, and at relevant
times Momcilo KRAJISNIK, Biljana PLAVSIC and others, were engaged in a variety
of actions to significantly reduce the Bosnian Muslim, Bosnian Croat and other
non-Serb populations of these municipalities.
From late March to 31 December 1992, Bosnian Serb forces seized physical
control of the municipalities listed in Paragraph 9, often through violent
attacks. These attacks and take-overs occurred in a co-ordinated and planned
manner. Organisation and direction of the take-overs that occurred between
late March and 31 December 1992 and the continuing acts of persecution and
deportation that occurred up to 30 November 1995, in particular from the
municipalities of Bijeljina, Banja Luka and the UN designated "safe area" of
Srebrenica (hereafter Srebrenica enclave) and its surroundings, were provided
by the SDS, military and police leadership, and the governing organs of Serb
municipalities, including the Crisis Staffs, War Presidencies and War
Commissions.
Between 1 April 1992 and 30 November 1995, Bosnian Serb forces were also
engaged in a forty-four month attack of Sarajevo, which involved inflicting
terror on persons living within Sarajevo.
Between 11 and 18 July 1995, Bosnian Serb forces killed thousands of Bosnian
Muslim men, who had been captured in several different locations in and around
the Srebrenica enclave.
By 30 November 1995, this course of conduct resulted in the death or forced
departure of a significant portion of the Bosnian Muslim, Bosnian Croat and
other non-Serb groups from the municipalities listed in Paragraph 9 and in and
around the Srebrenica enclave.
COUNTS 1-6
(GENOCIDE, COMPLICITY IN GENOCIDE, EXTERMINATION,
MURDER, WILFUL KILLING)
The Prosecutor re-alleges and incorporates by reference Paragraphs 1-15; and
alleges and incorporates by reference Paragraphs 67-92 in Counts 1-6.
Between 1 July 1991 and 31 December 1992, acting individually or in concert
with others, including Momcilo KRAJISNIK and Biljana PLAVSIC, and between
early March 1995 and 30 November 1995, acting individually or in concert with
others, Radovan KARADZIC; planned, instigated, ordered, committed or otherwise
aided and abetted the planning, preparation or execution of the destruction,
in whole or in part, of the Bosnian Muslim and Bosnian Croat national,
ethnical, racial or religious groups, as such, in several municipalities,
including but not limited to: Bijeljina; Bratunac; Bosanski Samac; Brcko;
Doboj; Foca; Ilijas; Kljuc; Kotor Varos; Novi Grad; Prijedor; Rogatica; Sanski
Most; Srebrenica; Visegrad; Vlasenica; Zavidovici; and Zvornik. The
destruction of these groups in these municipalities was effected by:
the killing of Bosnian Muslims and Bosnian Croats which took place during
and after the attacks on and within the municipalities; the killing of
Bosnian Muslims and Bosnian Croats in and after they had been taken away
from camps and detention facilities; and the killing of Bosnian Muslims
after their captivity in several different locations in and around the
Srebrenica enclave;
the causing of serious bodily or mental harm to Bosnian Muslims and Bosnian
Croats during their confinement in camps and detention facilities, and
during their interrogations at these locations, police stations and military
barracks, where detainees were continuously subjected to, or forced to
witness, inhumane acts including murder, sexual violence, torture, beatings
and robbery; and
the detention of Bosnian Muslims and Bosnian Croats in camps and detention
facilities under conditions of life calculated to bring about the physical
destruction in whole or in part of those national, ethnical, racial or
religious groups, as such, more fully set out in Paragraph 30.
KILLINGS
The killings by Bosnian Serb forces during and after the attacks on and within
these municipalities include, but are not limited to:
the killing on or about 1-2 April 1992 of at least forty-eight Bosnian
Muslim and/or Bosnian Croat men, women and children in Bijeljina town -
Bijeljina municipality;
the killing on or about 7-8 May 1992 of seventeen Bosnian Muslims and
Bosnian Croats at the Crkvina warehouse - Bosanski Samac municipality;
the killing on or about 4 May 1992 of approximately ten Bosnian Muslim and
Bosnian Croat males at the Hotel Posavina - Brcko municipality;
the killing on or about 10 May 1992 of thirty-four Bosnian Muslim and/or
Bosnian Croat civilians of the village of Gornja Grapska - Doboj
municipality;
the killing on or about 1 May 1992 of over sixty Bosnian Muslim and/or
Bosnian Croat villagers from Jelec - Foca municipality;
the execution on or about 5 June 1992 of eighteen Bosnian Muslim villagers
from Ljesevo - Ilijas municipality;
the execution on or about 30 May 1992 of the Bosnian Muslim and/or Bosnian
Croat villagers of Prhovo, including women and children, and the mass
execution on or about 1 June 1992 of over one hundred Bosnian Muslim and/or
Bosnian Croat males from the village of Velagici - Kljuc municipality;
the killing on or about 13 August 1992 of seventeen Bosnian Muslim males of
Dabovci village, and the killing in November 1992 of approximately one
hundred and ninety Bosnian Muslim and Bosnian Croat males of Grabovica
village - Kotor Varos municipality.
the killing on or about 23 July 1992 of approximately ten Bosnian Muslim
villagers of Carakovo - Prijedor municipality;
the killing on or about 25 May 1992 of more than thirty Bosnian Muslim
and/or Bosnian Croat women and children in the village of Hrustovo - Sanski
Most municipality;
the execution throughout June 1992 of hundreds of Bosnian Muslim men, women
and children of Visegrad at various bridges over the Drina, and the 14 June
1992 killing of more than sixty Bosnian Muslim and/or Bosnian Croat
villagers from Koritnik village -Visegrad municipality;
the killing on or about 2 May 1992 of approximately twelve Bosnian Muslim
and/or Bosnian Croat males from the village of Drum, and the killing on or
about 16 May 1992 of over sixty Bosnian Muslim and/or Bosnian Croat men,
women and children of the village of Zaklopaca - Vlasenica municipality;
the killing on or about 25 June 1992 of twenty-one Bosnian Muslim and/or
Bosnian Croat civilians from Vozuca village - Zavidovici municipality;
the killing on or about 9 April 1992 of fifteen Bosnian Muslim and/or
Bosnian Croat males from the town of Zvornik - Zvornik municipality.
SDS and government authorities established camps and detention facilities in
the municipalities. Following the attacks on the municipalities, Bosnian Serb
forces rounded up tens of thousands of Bosnian Muslims and Bosnian Croats and
forced them to march to assembly points, for transfer to the camps and
detention facilities. Bosnian Muslims and Bosnian Croats were pulled from the
columns during these marches and executed.
Many thousands of those Bosnian Muslims and Bosnian Croats who survived the
attacks and forced marches were taken to these camps and detention facilities,
including but not limited to:
Manjaca in Banja Luka municipality, from about 21 April to 18 December 1992;
Batkovic in Bijeljina municipality, from about 1 June to 31 December 1992;
the Vuk Karadzic school in Bratunac municipality, from 1 May to 31 December
1992;
Luka in Brcko municipality, from 7 May to early July 1992;
Bare ammunition warehouse from 1 May 1992, Spreca prison from 1 May 1992,
the SUP station from 1 May to 31 July 1992, Percin’s Disco from 1 May 1992,
Sevarlije JNA barracks from 1 May to 30 June 1992, and the JNA hangars near
the Bosanska plantation from May 1992, all in Doboj municipality;
KP Dom in Foca municipality, from 18 April to 31 December 1992;
Omarska from 15 May to 15 August 1992, Keraterm from 15 May to 6 August
1992, and Trnopolje from 15 May to 30 September 1992 in Prijedor
municipality;
Rasadnik/Sladara from 1 May to 31 December 1992 and Veljko Vlahovic School
from 1 May to 31 August 1992, in Rogatica municipality;
Betonirka from 27 May to 7 July 1992 in Sanski Most municipality;
Susica from 2 June to early September 1992 in Vlasenica municipality;
Celopek Dom Kultur from 29 May to 30 June 1992, Ekonomija Farm from about 7
May to 22 May 1992, Karakaj Technical School from 29 May to June 1992 in
Zvornik municipality.
These camps and detention facilities were staffed and operated by military and
police personnel, under the ultimate direction and control of senior Bosnian
Serb leadership, including Radovan KARADZIC, Momcilo KRAJISNIK and Biljana
PLAVSIC, more fully set out in Paragraphs 60-66.
The killing by Bosnian Serb forces of Bosnian Muslim and Bosnian Croats in
these camps and detention facilities, or after they had been taken away from
them, includes but is not limited to:
the May 1992 summary execution of Bosnian Muslim detainees in Luka Camp -
Brcko municipality;
the killings through May and June 1992 of military aged Bosnian Muslim
and/or Bosnian Croat male prisoners from Susica camp - Vlasenica
municipality;
the killings in June 1992 of over thirty Bosnian Muslim and/or Bosnian
Croats male prisoners at the Celopek Dom Kultur; the mass killing on or
about 1-5 June 1992 of approximately one hundred and sixty Bosnian Muslim
males at Karakaj Technical School; the killing on or about 5-8 June 1992 of
approximately one hundred and ninety Bosnian Muslim and/or Bosnian Croat
prisoners at Gero’s slaughterhouse - Zvornik municipality;
the mass killing on or about 14 June 1992 of forty-seven Bosnian Muslim men
from Rajlovac camp - Novi Grad municipality;
the execution on or about 15 June 1992 of at least ten Bosnian Muslim males
from Visegrad – Rogatica municipality;
the execution on or about 20 July 1992 of over one-hundred and fifty Bosnian
Muslim and/or Bosnian Croat males from the "Brdo" region of Prijedor at
Omarska camp; the execution on or about 24-25 July 1992 of approximately one
hundred and fifty Bosnian Muslim and/or Bosnian Croat males in Room 3 of
Keraterm camp; the mass execution on or about 21 August 1992 of
approximately one hundred and fifty Bosnian Muslim and/or Bosnian Croat
males from Trnopolje camp on Vlasic mountain in Skender Vakuf – Prijedor
municipality;
the killing and repeated beating and torture over the month of July 1992 of
thirty-six Bosnian Muslim detainees in Foca KP Dom; the killing on or about
5 August 1992 of over twenty Bosnian Muslim male detainees from Kalinovik
municipality who were taken to Foca KP Dom, and from there later killed near
Jelec - Foca municipality.
The 1992 take-overs, referred to in paragraph 12, gave the Bosnian Serb forces
control of the majority of major municipalities in eastern Bosnia and the
"ethnic cleansing" that followed and continued through 1993-1995, especially
from the municipalities of Bijeljina and Banja Luka, forced the Bosnian
Muslims and Bosnian Croats of these municipalities to leave. The Bosnian
Muslims mainly fled into the thinly populated rural areas of eastern Bosnia
and Herzegovina that had so far escaped the attention of the Bosnian Serb
forces. The Bosnian Muslim populations within those areas, including
Srebrenica, swelled dramatically.
On 16 April 1993, the Security Council of the UN acting pursuant to Chapter
VII of its Charter, adopted Resolution 819, in which it demanded that all
parties to the conflict in Bosnia and Herzegovina treat Srebrenica, Zepa,
Gorazde, Sarajevo and Tuzla (and their surroundings) as "safe areas" which
were to be free from any armed attack or any other hostile act.
On 8 March 1995, Radovan KARADZIC, as Supreme Commander instructed the Bosnian
Serb forces to create an unbearable situation of total insecurity with no hope
of further survival of life for the inhabitants of, inter alia, Srebrenica.
On or about 6 July 1995, Bosnian Serb forces shelled Srebrenica and attacked
UN observation posts that were located in the "safe area". This attack on the
Srebrenica "safe area" continued until 11 July 1995, when combined forces from
several units of the Bosnian Serb forces entered Srebrenica. The Bosnian
Muslims who were in Srebrenica after the beginning on the attack took two
courses of action in response.
One group of several thousand Bosnian Muslim men, women and children fled to
the UN compound in Potocari, which was located within the "safe area" of
Srebrenica. On 12 July 1995, Bosnian Serb forces separated the Bosnian
Muslim men and boys from the women and children and detained them in and
around Potocari. The women and children were later transported by buses and
trucks to areas outside the enclave.
A second group of approximately 15, 000 thousands Bosnian Muslim men along
with some women and children fled in a huge column, through the woods
towards Tuzla. Thousands of Bosnian Muslim men from the retreating column
were captured by or surrendered to the Bosnian Serb forces.
Between 11 and 18 July 1995, Bosnian Serb forces executed thousands of Bosnian
Muslim men in an organised, widespread and systematic manner. In particular,
those forces summarily executed Bosnian Muslim men at the places where they
were detained shortly after they had been captured and at other sites to which
they had been transported for execution.
These killings were committed at several different locations in and around the
Srebrenica enclave, including but not limited to:
the execution on or about the 12-13 July 1995 of numerous Bosnian Muslim men
at diverse locations around the UN compound at Potocari;
the killings on or about the 12 to 15 July 1995 of numerous Bosnian Muslim
men at various locations in and around Bratunac;
the execution on or about the 12 to 14 July 1995 of twenty-five Bosnian
Muslim men near Tisca;
the execution on or about the 13 July 1995 of hundreds of Bosnian Muslim men
who had been imprisoned in a large warehouse in the village of Kravica;
the execution on or about the 14 July 1995 of hundreds of Bosnian Muslim men
at the Grbavci school complex and the nearby village of Orahovac (near
Lazete) and ;
the execution on or about the 14 to 15 July 1995 of hundreds of Bosnian
Muslim men in and around the "Dam" near Petkovci;
the execution on or about the 14 to 21 July 1995 of over hundred Bosnian
Muslim men along a dirt road in the Cerska Valley;
the execution on or about the 14 to 16 July 1995 of hundreds of Bosnian
Muslim men at the school at Pilica;
the execution on or about the 16 July 1995 of hundreds of Bosnian Muslim men
at Branjevo Military Farm;
the execution on or about the 16 July 1995 of approximately five hundred
Bosnian Muslim men inside the Pilica Cultural Centre;
the execution on or about the 17 July 1995 of hundreds of Bosnian Muslim men
near Kozluk.
CAUSING SERIOUS BODILY OR MENTAL HARM
In the camps and detention facilities, referred to in paragraphs 20 and 22,
Bosnian Serb forces and others who were given unrestricted access to the
camps, subjected Bosnian Muslim and Bosnian Croat detainees from the
municipalities to physical and mental abuse, causing them serious bodily or
mental harm. As a result of these inhumane acts, during the period from late
March 1992 to 31 December 1992, thousands of Bosnian Muslims and Bosnian
Croats died in these detention facilities.
CONDITIONS CALCULATED TO BRING ABOUT PHYSICAL DESTRUCTION
Conditions in the camps and detention facilities included inadequate food,
often amounting to starvation rations, foul water, insufficient or
non-existent medical care, inadequate hygiene conditions and lack of space.
Between 1 July 1991 and 30 November 1995, Radovan KARADZIC knew or had reason
to know that Bosnian Serb forces under his direction and control were
committing the acts described in Paragraphs 17 through 30 above, or had done
so. Radovan KARADZIC failed to take the necessary and reasonable measures to
prevent such acts or punish the perpetrators thereof.
In addition, between 1 December 1995 and 19 July 1996, Radovan KARADZIC knew
or had reason to know that Bosnian Serb forces under his direction and control
had committed the acts described in Paragraphs 17 through 30 above. Radovan
KARADZIC failed to take the necessary and reasonable measures to punish the
perpetrators thereof.
By these acts and omissions, Radovan KARADZIC participated in:
Count 1: GENOCIDE, punishable under Articles 4(3)(a), and 7(1) and 7(3) of the
Statute of the Tribunal.
Count 2: COMPLICITY IN GENOCIDE, punishable under Articles 4(3)(e), and 7(1) and
7(3) of the Statute of the Tribunal.
Count 3: Extermination, a CRIME AGAINST HUMANITY punishable under Articles 5(b),
and 7(1) and 7(3) of the Statute of the Tribunal.
Count 4: Murder, a CRIME AGAINST HUMANITY, punishable under Articles 5(a), and
7(1) and 7(3) of the Statute of the Tribunal.
Count 5: Murder, a VIOLATION OF THE LAWS OR CUSTOMS OF WAR, as recognised by
Common Article 3(1)(a) of the Geneva Conventions of 1949, punishable under
Articles 3, and 7(1) and 7(3) of the Statute of the Tribunal.
Count 6: Wilful killing, a GRAVE BREACH OF THE GENEVA CONVENTIONS OF 1949,
punishable under Articles 2(a) and 7(1) and 7(3) of the Statute of the Tribunal.
COUNT 7
(PERSECUTIONS)
The Prosecutor re-alleges and incorporates by reference Paragraphs 16-32; and
alleges and incorporates by reference Paragraphs 38-41 and 67-92 in count 7.
Between 1 July 1991 and 30 November 1995, Radovan KARADZIC, acting
individually or in concert with others, including acting in concert with
Momcilo KRAJISNIK and Biljana PLAVSIC between 1 July 1991 and 31 December
1992; planned, instigated, ordered, committed or otherwise aided and abetted
the planning, preparation or execution of persecutions of the Bosnian Muslim,
Bosnian Croat and other non-Serb populations of the municipalities listed in
Paragraph 9 and the Srebrenica enclave. These persecutions included but are
not limited to:
the killing by Bosnian Serb forces of thousands of Bosnian Muslims and
Bosnian Croats, during and after the attacks on the areas and municipalities
listed in Paragraphs 17 and 18; in the camps and detention facilities as
described in Paragraphs 20 and 22; and after their captivity in several
different locations in and around the Srebrenica enclave as described in
Paragraph 28.
the forced transfer or deportation by Bosnian Serb forces of tens of
thousands of Bosnian Muslims, Bosnian Croats and other non- Serbs from the
municipalities listed in Paragraph 9, and Bosnian Muslims from the
Srebrenica enclave;
the inhumane treatment and/or torture of Bosnian Muslims, Bosnian Croats and
other non-Serbs from the municipalities listed in Paragraph 9. During and
after the attacks on these municipalities, whether they were taken to
detention centers, police stations, military barracks, private homes or
other locations, Bosnian Serb forces subjected Bosnian Muslims, Bosnian
Croats and other non-Serb civilians to brutal, inhumane treatment, which
included beatings, sexual violence and death threats on a daily basis. Many
were forced to witness executions and brutal assaults of other detainees;
the constant humiliation and degradation by Bosnian Serb forces of Bosnian
Muslims, Bosnian Croats and other non-Serbs from the municipalities listed
in Paragraph 9. In the detention facilities, Bosnian Muslim, Bosnian Croat
and other non-Serb males and females suffered egregious, inhumane conditions
on a daily basis. Detainees were deprived of adequate nutrition, adequate
medical care, hygienic sanitation facilities, and were forced to endure
inhumane accommodations. The detainees subsisted in an atmosphere of
constant terror fostered by random brutality. Physical violence, mental
suffering, sexual violence and other degrading and humiliating circumstances
that constituted fundamental attacks on their humanity were repeatedly
inflicted upon the detainees;
the denial of fundamental rights by Bosnian Serb forces to Bosnian Muslims,
Bosnian Croats and other non-Serbs from the municipalities listed in
Paragraph 9, including the right to work, freedom of movement, the right to
judicial process, and the right of equal access to public services including
proper medical care;
the wanton destruction by Bosnian Serb forces of Bosnian Muslim, Bosnian
Croat and other non-Serb cities, towns and villages in the municipalities
listed in Paragraph 9. During and after the attacks on these municipalities,
Bosnian Serb forces systematically destroyed Bosnian Muslim, Bosnian Croat
and other non-Serb cities, towns, villages and property, including homes,
businesses and Muslim and Roman Catholic sacred sites. Buildings were
shelled, torched or dynamited. The destruction was so extensive that nothing
but portions of buildings and rubble remained in many of these
municipalities. Buildings associated with the Serbian Orthodox religion
remained untouched.
Between 1 July 1991 and 30 November 1995, Radovan KARADZIC knew or had reason
to know that Bosnian Serb forces under his direction and control were
committing the acts described in Paragraph 34 above, or had done so. Radovan
KARADZIC failed to take the necessary and reasonable measures to prevent such
acts or to punish the perpetrators thereof.
In addition, between 1 December 1995 and 19 July 1996, Radovan KARADZIC knew
or had reason to know that Bosnian Serb forces under his direction and control
had committed the acts described in Paragraph 34 above. Radovan KARADZIC
failed to take the necessary and reasonable measures to punish the
perpetrators thereof.
By these acts and omissions, Radovan KARADZIC participated in:
Count 7: Persecutions on political, racial and religious grounds, a CRIME
AGAINST HUMANITY, punishable under Articles 5(h), and 7(1) and 7(3) of the
Statute of the Tribunal.
COUNTS 8-9
(DEPORTATION, OTHER INHUMANE ACTS)
The Prosecutor re-alleges and incorporates by reference Paragraphs 33-36; and
alleges and incorporates by reference Paragraphs 67-92 in counts 8-9.
Between 1 July 1991 and 30 November 1995, Radovan KARADZIC, acting
individually or in concert with others, including acting in concert with
Momcilo KRAJISNIK and Biljana PLAVSIC between 1 July 1991 and 31 December
1992; planned, instigated, ordered, committed or otherwise aided and abetted
the planning, preparation or execution of the forced transfer and deportation
of tens of thousands of Bosnian Muslims, Bosnian Croats and other non-Serbs
from the municipalities listed in Paragraph 9 and the Srebrenica enclave.
From early April 1992, the organised forcible transfer of the Bosnian Muslim,
Bosnian Croat and other non-Serb populations of the municipalities listed in
Paragraph 9 began. Between 1 January 1993 and 30 November 1995 the forcible
transfers continued, especially from the municipalities of Bijeljina and Banja
Luka.
Between 11 July 1995 and 18 July 1995 thousands of Bosnian Muslims were
forcible transferred from the Srebrenica enclave. As a result of these actions
the Bosnian Serb forces virtually eliminated the presence of any Bosnian
Muslims in the Srebrenica enclave area, thus further continuing an "ethnic
cleansing" campaign which had begun in early April 1992.
The Bosnian Muslim, Bosnian Croat and non-Serb groups were mainly deported to
areas in Bosnia and Herzegovina under the control of the internationally
recognised government and to Croatia and Serbia. The forced transfers and
deportations were organised by the Bosnian Serb police forces and other
Bosnian Serb municipal organs operating at the direction of the Crisis Staffs.
In many cases, Bosnian Muslims, Bosnian Croats and other non-Serbs were
required to sign documents stating that they were turning over all of their
property to the Bosnian Serb republic in order for Bosnian Serb authorities to
allow them to leave or to release them from detention facilities.
Between 1 July 1991 and 30 November 1995, Radovan KARADZIC knew or had reason
to know that Bosnian Serb forces under his direction and control were
committing the acts described in Paragraphs 38 through 41 above, or had done
so. Radovan KARADZIC failed to take the necessary and reasonable measures to
prevent such acts or punish the perpetrators thereof.
In addition, between 1 December 1995 and 19 July 1996, Radovan KARADZIC knew
or had reason to know that Bosnian Serb forces under his direction and control
had committed the acts described in Paragraph 38 through 41 above. Radovan
KARADZIC failed to take the necessary and reasonable measures to punish the
perpetrators thereof.
By these acts and omissions, Radovan KARADZIC participated in:
Count 8: Deportation, a CRIME AGAINST HUMANITY punishable under Articles 5(d),
and 7(1) and 7(3) of the Statute of the Tribunal.
Count 9: Other inhumane acts (forcible transfer), a CRIME AGAINST HUMANITY
punishable under Articles 5(i), and 7(1) and 7(3) of the Statute of the
Tribunal.
COUNT 10
(UNLAWFULLY INFLICTING TERROR UPON CIVILIANS)
The Prosecutor re-alleges and incorporates by reference Paragraphs 1-15; and
alleges and incorporates by reference Paragraphs 67-92 in count 10.
Between 1 July 1991 and 30 November 1995, Radovan KARADZIC, individually or in
concert with others, planned, instigated, ordered, committed or otherwise
aided and abetted in the planning, preparation or execution of a protracted
campaign of shelling and sniping upon civilian areas of Sarajevo and upon the
civilian population thereby inflicting terror upon its civilian population.
Shortly after Bosnia and Herzegovina was internationally recognised as an
independent state on 6 April 1992, armed hostilities broke out in Sarajevo.
Even before the conflict began, armed forces supporting the SDS and elements
of the Yugoslav Peoples Army (hereafter JNA) occupied strategic positions in
and around Sarajevo. The city was subsequently subjected to blockade,
bombardment and sniper attacks from these positions. Much of the bombardment
and sniping was from positions in the hills around and overlooking Sarajevo,
from which the attackers had a clear, detailed and commanding view of the city
and its population.
On or about 20 May 1992, after a partial withdrawal of JNA forces from Bosnia
and Herzegovina, the JNA forces surrounding Sarajevo were effectively
transformed into the Sarajevo Romanija Corps of the Army of the Serbian
republic.
For forty-four months, the Sarajevo Romanija Corps implemented a military
strategy that used shelling and sniping to kill, maim, wound and terrorise the
civilian inhabitants of Sarajevo. The shelling and sniping killed and wounded
thousands of civilians of both sexes and all ages, including children and the
elderly.
The Sarajevo Romanija Corps directed shelling and sniping at civilians who
were tending vegetable plots, queuing for and collecting water or bread,
attending funerals, playing and watching football, shopping in markets, riding
on trams, gathering wood, or simply walking with their children or friends.
People were injured and killed, even inside their own homes, hit by bullets
targeted through their windows. The attacks on Sarajevo civilians were often
unrelated to military actions and were designed to keep the inhabitants in a
constant state of terror.
Because of the shelling and sniping against civilians, the life of every
Sarajevo inhabitant became a daily struggle to survive. Without gas,
electricity or running water, people were forced to venture outside to find
basic living necessities. Each time they did, whether to collect wood, fetch
water or buy some bread, they risked death. In addition to the sheer human
carnage that the shelling and sniping caused, the endless threat of death and
maiming caused extensive trauma and psychological damage to the inhabitants of
Sarajevo.
Between 1 July 1991 and 30 November 1995, Radovan KARADZIC knew or had reason
to know that Bosnian Serb forces under his direction and control, were
committing the acts described in Paragraphs 45 through 50 above or had done
so. Radovan KARADZIC failed to take the necessary and reasonable measures to
prevent such acts or to punish the perpetrators thereof.
In addition, between 1 December 1995 and 19 July 1996, Radovan KARADZIC knew
or had reason to know that Bosnian Serb forces under his direction and control
had committed the acts described in Paragraphs 45 through 50 above. Radovan
KARADZIC failed to take the necessary and reasonable measures to punish the
perpetrators thereof.
By these acts and omissions, Radovan KARADZIC participated in:
Count 10: Unlawfully inflicting terror upon civilians, a VIOLATION OF THE LAWS
OR CUSTOMS OF WAR, as set forth in Article 51 of Additional Protocol I and
Article 13 of Additional Protocol II to the Geneva Conventions of 1949;
punishable under Articles 3, and 7(1) and 7(3) of the Statute of the Tribunal.
COUNT 11
(TAKING OF HOSTAGES)
The Prosecutor re-alleges and incorporates by reference Paragraphs 1-15; and
alleges and incorporates by reference Paragraphs 67-92 in count 11.
Between 25 and 26 May 1995 air strikes were undertaken by the North Atlantic
Treaty Organisation (hereafter NATO) against Serbian forces in Bosnia and
Herzegovina.
Between 26 May 1995 and 2 June 1995, Radovan KARADZIC, acting individually or
in concert with others, planned, instigated, ordered, committed or otherwise
aided and abetted the planning, preparation or execution of the taking of UN
military observers and UN peacekeepers as hostages, following the NATO air
strikes on 25 and 26 May 1995.
Bosnian Serb forces detained over two hundred UN peacekeepers and military
observers in Pale, Sarajevo and other locations. They held them hostage by
force at locations of strategic or military significance across Bosnia and
Herzegovina, in order to render these locations immune from further NATO
airstrikes and to prevent the airstrikes from continuing. Some of the hostages
were assaulted and otherwise maltreated during their captivity. Some of these
hostages were forced to warn their UN commanders that they would be killed if
NATO continued to bomb.
During and after protracted negotiations with Bosnian Serb leaders, including
Radovan KARADZIC, the UN hostages were released in stages between 3 and 19
June 1995.
Between 26 May 1995 and 2 June 1995, Radovan KARADZIC knew or had reason to
know that Bosnian Serb forces under his direction and control were committing
the acts described in Paragraphs 55 and 56 above, or had done so. Radovan
KARADZIC failed to take the necessary and reasonable measures to prevent such
acts or punish the perpetrators thereof.
In addition, between 3 June 1995 and 19 July 1996, Radovan KARADZIC knew or
had reason to know that Bosnian Serb forces under his direction and control
had committed the acts described in Paragraphs 55 and 56 above. Radovan
KARADZIC failed to take the necessary and reasonable measures to punish the
perpetrators thereof.
By these acts and omissions, Radovan KARADZIC participated in:
Count 11: Taking of hostages, a VIOLATION OF THE LAWS OR CUSTOMS OF WAR, as
recognised by Common Article 3(1)(b) of the Geneva Conventions of 1949,
punishable under Articles 3, and 7(1) and 7(3) of the Statute of the Tribunal.
INDIVIDUAL CRIMINAL RESPONSIBILITY
Radovan KARADZIC acting individually between 1 July 1991 and 19 July 1996, or
in concert with others, including acting in concert with Momcilo KRAJISNIK and
Biljana PLAVSIC between 1 July 1991 to 31 December 1992; exercised both formal
and/or de facto power and control over the Bosnian Serb forces and all SDS and
government authorities who participated in the crimes alleged in this
indictment.
In particular, from 1 July 1991 to 31 December 1992, mainly through his
positions as President of the SDS, including President of the Main Board;
President of the National Security Council of the Serbian republic and
President of the Presidency of the Serbian republic, Radovan KARADZIC, acting
individually or in concert with Momcilo KRAJISNIK, Biljana PLAVSIC and others;
directed and controlled the Bosnian Serb forces and all SDS and government
authorities who participated in the crimes alleged in this indictment:
Radovan KARADZIC was President of the SDS and in that capacity was also,
inter alia, President of the Main Board of the SDS. Effectively the Main
Board was the main authority within the party’s hierarchy; it formulated the
party’s policies and ensured they were put into effect. The Main Board, of
which Momcilo KRAJISNIK was also a member from 12 July 1991, and SDS leaders
exercised direct control over the activities and policies of all levels of
the SDS, including the municipal boards. The Main Board ordered the creation
of the SDS Crisis Staffs in municipalities where Bosnian Serbs lived. The
chairmen of the SDS municipal boards were frequently the Presidents of or
members of the Crisis Staffs. Crisis Staffs included military and police
officials amongst their members. Crisis Staffs exercised complete executive,
legislative and regulatory authority in the areas under their control and
controlled the Bosnian Serb forces.
From 28 February 1992 until 12 May 1992, Radovan KARADZIC acting in concert
with Momcilo KRAJISNIK, Biljana PLAVSIC and others, were jointly responsible
for the deployment of the Bosnian Serb Territorial Defence in peace and in
war, and for the utilisation of the police in war and other emergency
situations. This became particular evident when the Bosnian Serb Assembly
created the National Security Council of the Serbian republic on 27 March
1992. Radovan KARADZIC became President of the Council and Momcilo KRAJISNIK
one of its members. The stated function of the National Security Council was
to consider political, legal, constitutional and other issues of interest
for the security of the Serbian People in Bosnia and Herzegovina. Radovan
KARADZIC was of the view that decisions of the National Security Council
should bind all the executive organs, the police and the government,
particularly in urgent situations where decisions had to be taken on war,
peace and other matters of national security. Until the Presidency was
formed on 12 May 1992, the National Security Council was effectively the
main body of authority in the Serbian republic.
The National Security Council exercised its authority on 15 April 1992 when
it recommended an immediate threat of war be declared. That same day,
signing as the Presidency, Biljana PLAVSIC and Nikola KOLJEVIC, declared the
imminent threat of war and ordered the mobilisation of the Bosnian Serb
Territorial Defence.
On 12 May 1992 Radovan KARADZIC became a member of the three-member
Presidency. On the same day Radovan KARADZIC was elected President of the
Presidency. On or about 2 June 1992 the Presidency was formally expanded to
include Momcilo KRAJISNIK and the President of the Government. From 12 May
to 17 December 1992 the Presidency was the Supreme Commander of the Bosnian
Serb army in peace and war and of the Bosnian Serb police forces in war and
other emergency situations. The Presidency decided on the deployment of the
army in war; appointed, promoted and discharged officers of the army of the
Bosnian Serb republic (hereafter VRS). In addition the Presidency received
reports on the activities of units under its command.
During the period 1 July 1991 to 31 December 1992, the Bosnian Serb forces,
SDS and governmental institutions were utilised by the Bosnian Serb
leadership, including Radovan KARADZIC, Momcilo KRAJISNIK and Biljana
PLAVSIC, to execute the crimes alleged within this indictment. In some
instances, with the support and encouragement of Radovan KARADZIC and
others, the Bosnian Serb forces, SDS and governmental institutions acted in
concert with forces from the Republics of Serbia and Montenegro.
On 17 December 1992 the Presidency was disbanded and Radovan KARADZIC was
elected sole President of the Serbian republic. (Republika Srpska).
Further, from 1 January 1993 until his resignation on 19 July 1996, mainly
through his positions as President of the SDS, including President of the Main
Board; President of the National Security Council of the Serbian republic,
President of Republika Srpska and Supreme Commander of the armed forces;
Radovan KARADZIC, acting individually or in concert with others, directed and
controlled the Bosnian Serb forces and all SDS and government authorities who
participated in the crimes alleged in this indictment:
From 17 December 1992, Radovan KARADZIC was sole President of Republika
Srpska and assumed all the powers of the Presidency, including that of
Supreme Commander of the armed forces, as more fully set out in paragraph 61
(d). As Supreme Commander, Radovan KARADZIC, acting in concert with other
members of the Supreme Command, commanded the armed forces.
During the period 1 January 1993 to 30 November 1995, the Bosnian Serb
forces, SDS and governmental institutions were utilised by the Bosnian Serb
leadership, including Radovan KARADZIC, to execute the crimes alleged within
this indictment.
In October and November 1991 the Bosnian Serb Assembly also authorised Radovan
KARADZIC, Biljana PLAVSIC and other leading members of the SDS to "represent
and protect the interests of the Serbian people in Bosnia and Herzegovina
vis-à-vis federal and international bodies;" and to negotiate with Muslim and
Croatian representatives on the organisation of future common life in Bosnia
and Herzegovina.
Radovan KARADZIC, both through the formal positions alleged above, and
pursuant to his de facto power, also had the authority to punish or to
initiate investigations or proceedings against any persons or members of the
armed forces under his command who were believed to have committed crimes on
the territory of the Serbian republic.
Therefore, between 1 July 1991 and 30 November 1995, both through the formal
positions alleged above, and pursuant to his de facto power, Radovan KARADZIC
knew or had reason to know that Bosnian Serb forces under the Bosnian Serb
leadership direction and control; were committing the crimes alleged in this
indictment or had done so, and failed to take necessary and reasonable
measures to prevent such acts or punish the perpetrators thereof.
In addition, between 1 December 1995 and 19 July 1996, Radovan KARADZIC both
through the formal positions alleged above, and pursuant to his de facto
power, Radovan KARADZIC knew or had reason to know that Bosnian Serb forces
under the Bosnian Serb leadership direction and control had committed the
crimes alleged in this indictment, and failed to take the necessary and
reasonable measures to punish the perpetrators thereof.
GENERAL ALLEGATIONS
All acts or omissions charged as Genocide or Complicity in Genocide, were
committed with intent to destroy, in whole or in part, Bosnian Muslims and
Bosnian Croats, a national, ethnical, racial or religious group, as such.
All acts and omissions charged as Crimes against humanity were part of a
widespread or systematic attack directed against the Bosnian Muslim, Bosnian
Croat and/or other non-Serb civilian populations of Bosnia and Herzegovina.
From 6 April 1992, a state of international armed conflict and partial
occupation existed in Bosnia and Herzegovina.
All acts and omissions charged as Grave Breaches of the Geneva Conventions of
1949 ("grave breaches") occurred during the international armed conflict and
partial occupation of Bosnia and Herzegovina.
Radovan KARADZIC was required to abide by the laws and customs governing the
conduct of armed conflicts, including the Geneva Conventions of 1949 and the
additional protocols thereto.
Radovan KARADZIC is individually responsible for the crimes alleged against
him in this indictment, pursuant to Article 7(1) of the Tribunal Statute.
Individual criminal responsibility includes planning, instigating, ordering,
committing or otherwise aiding and abetting in the planning, preparation or
execution of any crimes referred to in Articles 2 to 5 of the Tribunal
Statute.
Radovan KARADZIC while holding the positions of superior authority as set out
in the foregoing paragraphs, is also criminally responsible for the acts of
his subordinates, pursuant to Article 7(3) of the Statute of the Tribunal. A
superior is responsible for the acts of his subordinate(s) if he knew or had
reason to know that his subordinate(s) were about to commit such acts or had
done so and the superior failed to take the necessary and reasonable measures
to prevent such acts or to punish the perpetrators thereof.
ADDITIONAL FACTS
The SDS was one of the three ethnically oriented parties that emerged in
Bosnia and Herzegovina in 1990 in preparation for multi-party elections to be
held in November of that year. From its inception, Radovan KARADZIC was the
SDS party’s president, whilst Biljana PLAVSIC and Momcilo KRAJISNIK were
leading party members. Each of the three parties was aligned with one of the
three principal ethnic groups in Bosnia: the SDS was the principal Serb
national party; the Party of Democratic Action (hereafter SDA) was the main
Bosnian Muslim national party; the Croatian Democratic Community (hereafter
HDZ) was the leading Croat national party. The results of the elections
reflected the dominance of these three main national parties. At the Republic
level, the SDA won the most seats in the Assembly, followed by the SDS and
then the HDZ. The remaining seats were split between other parties, including
the former Communist Party.
The central idea within the SDS political platform, as articulated by its
leaders, including Radovan KARADZIC, Momcilo KRAJISNIK and Biljana PLAVSIC,
was the unity of all Serbs within Yugoslavia as the only way of protecting the
Serbian national interests. This idea was related to the concept of a "Greater
Serbia" which began to openly circulate in the Socialist Federal Republic of
Yugoslavia (hereafter SFRY) in the late 1980s. The SDS regarded the separation
of Bosnia and Herzegovina from the federal Yugoslav system as a threat to the
interests of the Serbs living in Bosnia and Herzegovina.
The results of the November 1990 elections meant that, as time went on, the
SDS would have had insufficient political authority to keep Bosnia and
Herzegovina in Yugoslavia through democratic political processes. In the
spring of 1991 the SDS began to organise certain areas of Bosnia and
Herzegovina into formal regional structures through the concept of
"Associations of Municipalities" which existed under the 1974 Yugoslav
constitutional regime.
Parallel to its organisational structure, which covered republic, regional,
municipal and local community levels, in 1991 the SDS leadership developed a
closed, covert internal system of command, control and communications. In this
system, the main authority belonged to the central SDS party organs and, in
particular, to the President and the Main Board of the party, thus ensuring
complete control by the party’s leadership.
In late June 1991, the SFRY began to disintegrate in a succession of wars
fought in Slovenia and Croatia after the two republics declared independence
on 25 June. The JNA withdrew from Slovenia after a very short period, allowing
for its secession from the SFRY. In Croatia, however, the fighting continued
throughout the summer and into the autumn of 1991.
For the war in Croatia, the JNA issued mobilisation orders to the male
population in Bosnia and Herzegovina. These orders were opposed by the
government of Bosnia and Herzegovina, which issued orders to the population
that they did not have to respond to the mobilisation. As a result, very few
Bosnian Muslims and Bosnian Croats answered the call-up. On the other hand,
Bosnian Serbs responded in large numbers, exhorted to do so by the SDS.
As the war in Croatia continued, it appeared increasingly likely that Bosnia
and Herzegovina would also declare its independence from the SFRY. The SDS
however, wanted Bosnia and Herzegovina to remain a part of Yugoslavia. As it
became clear that they would not be able to hold Bosnia and Herzegovina in the
Yugoslav federation, the SDS began in earnest the creation of a separate
Serbian territory in Bosnia and Herzegovina. By September 1991 the SDS
proclaimed one Serb Autonomous Region and four Serb Autonomous Districts
(hereafter SAOs). The SAOs became the first territorial foundation on which
the Serbian republic was to be founded.
As viewed by the SDS leaders, a major problem in the creation and control of
Serbian territory was the significant Bosnian Muslim and Bosnian Croat and
other non-Serb populations that lived in areas the SDS claimed. Thus, a
significant aspect of the plan to create a new Serbian state was the permanent
removal or "ethnic cleansing" of nearly all of the Bosnian Muslim, Bosnian
Croat and other non-Serb populations from those areas, allowing for the
presence of only a small number of non-Serbs who would agree to the conditions
for living in a Serb-dominated State.
In the autumn of 1991, the JNA began to withdraw its forces out of Croatia and
re-deploy them in Bosnia and Herzegovina. Working in conjunction with certain
elements in the JNA, the SDS began to covertly arm the Bosnian Serb civilian
population.
A separate Bosnian Serb Assembly, dominated by the SDS, was founded on 24
October 1991 as the highest representative and legislative organ of Serbs in
Bosnia.
In late December 1991 the leaders of the SDS began preparations for the
physical take-over of power in those municipalities of Bosnia and Herzegovina
where Serbs did not have clear control, and for the subsequent implementation
of a general plan for ethnically cleansing the areas they considered to be
Serbian. The take-overs were executed following instructions issued by the SDS
leadership, often through Crisis Staffs that were brought into being for this
purpose.
The Crisis Staff was modelled on an entity that had existed as part of the
defence system in the SFRY, and was designated to take over the functioning of
the municipalities or republic government, as the case may have been, during
times of war or a state of emergency when the Assembly, normally the highest
authority of government, would not have been able to function.
The Crisis Staffs began functioning in SDS-claimed municipalities in late
December 1991. They operated at both the regional and municipal levels of
authority as the bodies that would be responsible for the co-ordination of the
execution of most of the operational phase of the plan for ethnic cleansing.
On 31 May and 10 June 1992, the Presidency ordered the re-designation of the
Crisis Staffs as War Presidencies and then War Commissions in the
municipalities. The War Presidencies/War Commissions maintained the same
structure and virtually the same authority as the Crisis Staffs, and were
still commonly referred to by the public as Crisis Staffs.
The Crisis Staffs were to cease operation when the Assemblies were able to
meet or to conduct business again. The regular municipal organs would then
resume operation, generally under the direction of the same SDS leaders. These
municipal organs then approved or validated the actions of the Crisis Staffs.
On 9 January 1992, the Bosnian Serb Assembly proclaimed the "Serbian republic
of Bosnia and Herzegovina". The territory of that republic was declared to
include "the territories of the Serbian Autonomous Regions and Districts and
of other Serbian ethnic entities in Bosnia and Herzegovina, including the
regions in which the Serbian people remained in the minority due to the
genocide conducted against it in World War Two," and it was declared to be
part of the Yugoslav federal state.
From late March 1992, Bosnian Serb forces began to seize physical control of
ethnically mixed municipalities that had been declared part of the Serbian
state, including but not limited to the municipalities listed in Paragraph 9.
These attacks and take-overs occurred in a similar, co-ordinated and planned
manner. The attacks, take-overs and subsequent events were planned,
instigated, ordered, committed or otherwise aided and abetted by Crisis
Staffs, War Presidencies, War Commissions and other SDS and government
authorities acting under the control and direction of the SDS leadership,
including Radovan KARADZIC, Momcilo KRAJISNIK and Biljana PLAVSIC.
Also on 12 May 1992 the Bosnian Serb Assembly voted to create the VRS,
effectively transforming the JNA units remaining in Bosnia and Herzegovina and
other armed forces working in concert in Bosnia and Herzegovina into commands
of the new army. The Bosnian Serb Assembly appointed Ratko MLADIC as Commander
of the VRS Main Staff. In this capacity Ratko MLADIC was directly subordinate
to the Presidency.
The JNA "officially" withdrew from Bosnia and Herzegovina on 19 May 1992, but
military operations directed against the non-Serb population continued to be
carried out by the VRS and Bosnian Serb police. The JNA, which had been
re-named the Yugoslav Army (hereafter VJ) during the SFRY’s reconstitution as
the FRY in April 1992, continued to have strong links with the VRS. It
provided critical combat, financial, and logistic support to the Bosnian Serb
military effort. Many officers, commanders, soldiers, logistical centres and
much equipment and supplies of the former JNA was left behind for Bosnian Serb
use. Former JNA officers were transferred from their posts in JNA units to the
same unit’s VRS successor and most remained in command of those units
throughout the conflict in Bosnia and Herzegovina. The salaries of VRS
officers continued to be paid by Belgrade. Additionally, from time to time
after 19 May 1992, elements of the VJ had a direct role in the conflict in
Bosnia and Herzegovina, and provided critical combat support to the VRS.
_____________________
Carla Del Ponte
Prosecutor
Dated this 28th day of April 2000
At The Hague,
The Netherlands
Karadjica sude zbog zalosti sto su zivi oni sto su zivi.,nemogu da prebole sto je zahuktala kompozicija zakocena u Srbiji. mislim da svako ko je pametan i realan,nebi mu to smetalo da mu se stvarno sudi zbog genocida i zbogh toga sto zale muslimanski narod,svako je narod svako voli da zivi. muslimanski narod se voli iz Meke,muslimanski odnosno islimski narod je i u Palestini,strasno ih zale ovi iz Berlina,sve ucinise od sebe da Izrael vise ne proganja te napacene ljude.evropska demokratija nevoli vizionare koji otkrivaju njihove namere,oni vole slepce koji nevide njihove namere.
